current affairs MCQ #12524

At an international conference on South Asian security, a scholar argues that the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan has paradoxically made the Kashmir conflict more dangerous. Which mechanism best explains this argument?

current affairs MCQ #12524

  1. Question 1

    Q1. At an international conference on South Asian security, a scholar argues that the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan has paradoxically made the Kashmir conflict more dangerous. Which mechanism best explains this argument?

    • A) Nuclear weapons make large-scale war impossible, so the Kashmir dispute will remain frozen permanently without resolution
    • B) India's nuclear arsenal is entirely targeted at China, not Pakistan, making Kashmir a conventional military problem only
    • C) Nuclear deterrence prevents all-out war but may encourage sub-conventional proxy conflicts and cross-LOC militancy, creating a stability-instability paradox where nuclear weapons deter large wars while enabling low-level conflict
    • D) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty explicitly prohibits the use of nuclear threats in territorial disputes like Kashmir

    Answer: Nuclear deterrence prevents all-out war but may encourage sub-conventional proxy conflicts and cross-LOC militancy, creating a stability-instability paradox where nuclear weapons deter large wars while enabling low-level conflict

    Explanation: The stability-instability paradox, first articulated by scholars Glenn Snyder and later applied to South Asia by Michael Krepon and others, holds that nuclear deterrence prevents large-scale conventional war between nuclear-armed states while paradoxically lowering the threshold for sub-conventional conflict — because each side calculates that the other will.